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NOTE
VIGILANTE JUSTICE:
ENSURING THAT CONSUMER CREDIT
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ABOVE THE LAW IN
COLLINS FINANCIAL SERVICES V. VIGILANTE
ERIC Y. WU∗
“[I]magine if someone came [to court] to give eyewitness testimony in a
traffic accident case and they didn’t actually see the crash. They just read
about it somewhere. Well, this is the same thing. The debt buyers don’t know
anything about the debt. They just read about it.”
1
—Jerry Jarzombek, Consumer Lawyer
“The utter failure of large numbers of consumer credit plaintiffs to prove
their cases has created substantial problems requiring the courts to take steps to
insure that the due process rights of the unrepresented debtors and even
defaulting defendants are protected.”
2
—Judge Philip S. Straniere, New York Civil Court

∗ Associate Managing Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 60; J.D.,
2011, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A., International and Area
Studies, 2007, Washington University in St. Louis. Many thanks to Professor Richard
Ugelow of the American University General Practice Clinic for helping develop the topic
of this Note and to Peter Tran, Kimberly Harding, Bethany Dickman, Mary Gardner,
Ian Spear, and the staff of the American University Law Review for their work in
preparing this piece for publication. I would also like to especially thank my friends,
family, and Pamela Tsang for their support throughout law school.
1. David Segal, Debt Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer’s Cramp, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2010, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a consumer lawyer’s
description of what he typically tells the court in a debt collection case) .
2. Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Dalbis, No. 300082/10, 2011 WL 873512, at *13
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. Mar. 14, 2011).
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INTRODUCTION
In July of 2010, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a
3
report calling for the reform of debt collection litigation.
Recognizing the “broken” system of debt collection litigation, the
FTC advocated for increased notice standards for consumers,
increased pleading requirements for debt collection complaints,
clearer guidelines for statutes of limitations, and limitations on the
amounts of exempted funds that consumer credit plaintiffs can
4
garnish.
However, without legislative action to follow, these
recommendations have had little impact on the debt collection
5
industry. Instead, with the proliferation of automated software,
6
lawsuits are being filed at rapid rates and consumers are suffering.
7
With debt collection reform stalling in state legislatures, the onus has
fallen on courts to implement changes in the system. Over the past
8
year, courts in New York have been leading this reform, with recent

3. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN
DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 1 (July 2010) [hereinafter BROKEN
SYSTEM], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf.
4. Id. at i–iv. This Note will focus on the increased pleading requirements.
5. See Andrew Martin, Automated Debt-Collection Lawsuits Engulf Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2010, at B1 (noting the limited authority of the FTC to write rules and the
necessity of states to adopt any rules).
6. See, e.g., Segal, supra note 1 (reporting that the Legal Aid Society found that
in New York City alone there were 450,000 debt buying cases yielding $1.1 billion
from 2006 to 2008); see also Martin, supra note 5 (noting that one debt collection firm
with fourteen lawyers files roughly 80,000 lawsuits a year, averaging about 5,700 cases
per lawyer).
7. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Fairness Act, Assemb. 633, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess.,
§ 6 (N.Y. 2011) (introduced on January 5, 2011); Consumer Credit Fairness Act, S.
677, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (same); Consumer Credit Fairness Act, S.
4398, 232d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009) (introduced on April 22, 2009 with no
further action); Consumer Credit Fairness Act, Assemb. 7559, 232d Legis., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2009) (introduced on April 14, 2009).
8. See William Glaberson, In New York, Some Judges Are Now Skeptical About Debt
Collectors’ Claims, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, at A15 (reporting on the “sarcastic or
incredulous” rulings of the New York courts in response to practices of debt
collectors).
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notable decisions attacking the consumer credit industry, particularly
9
those authored by Judge Philip S. Straniere.
This Note advocates for the adoption of increased documentation
requirements for default judgments in debt collection lawsuits called
for in the decision of the New York Civil Court in Collins Financial
10
Services v. Vigilante. Part I of this Note provides a background on
debt collection and default judgment lawsuits and discusses the
procedural history of Vigilante. Part II examines the decision in
Vigilante, focusing on the court’s decision to increase documentation
requirements, both for the affidavits and the documentation
underlying the affidavits in default judgments. Part II also analyzes
how these requirements will impact future debt collection litigation.
This Note concludes by suggesting that courts in other jurisdictions
have an opportunity to protect consumers by implementing similar
requirements in consumer credit cases because these decisions have
the potential to change the unjust behaviors of the debt collection
industry.
I.

BACKGROUND

As the United States recovers from the recent recession, many
Americans continue to deal with “joblessness, sinking home values,
and a slumping economy . . . [and] American consumers now carry
11
more unsecured credit card debt than ever before.” When credit
obligations become too burdensome, a consumer is left with few
options to take control of his or her debt, such as bankruptcy, debt
12
management, or debt settlement. If, however, a consumer is not

9. See William Glaberson, In This Judge’s Decisions, You Never Know Who Will Crop
Up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at A17 (noting the effect the recession has had on
increasing the presence of credit card companies in Judge Straniere’s courtroom).
10. 915 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Civ. Ct. 2011).
11. See Derek S. Witte, The Bear Hug that is Crushing Debt-Burdened Americans: Why
Overzealous Regulation of the Debt-Settlement Industry Ultimately Harms the Consumers It
Means to Protect, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 278–79 (2010) (noting that consumer
debt was at its highest in late 2008 and that “almost 80% of all households that have
credit cards owe more than $10,000 in unsecured credit card debt”).
12. See id. at 281–89 (recognizing the “options” of bankruptcy and traditional
debt management, but advocating instead for debt settlement as an option that is
accessible to consumers). An individual filing for bankruptcy would either (1)
receive a fresh start from debts once all assets are surrendered to the court or (2)
maintain some assets and debt obligations while the individual continues to repay
portions of the debt. Id. at 281. Debt management involves an individual working
with, and paying, nonprofit credit counselors who then distribute the payments to
the individual’s various lenders. Id. at 283–84. On the surface, this seems like a
reasonable option for individuals to climb out of debt, yet debt management
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proactive about a credit obligation, or is unable to take advantage of
one of the above options, a lawsuit is often initiated against the
13
consumer by the owner of the debt.
A. Overview of Debt Collection Lawsuits
In some of these lawsuits, the original creditor is the one who files
14
to collect on the debt. However, a growing practice is debt-buying,
15
where the original creditors hand over the debt to debt buyers. This
debt is typically bought for pennies on the dollar in larger portfolios
of debt by the debt buyers, who then hire collectors to “commence a
16
campaign of insistent letters and regular phone calls.”
When a
debtor continues to avoid payment, the consumer credit plaintiff
17
then initiates a lawsuit.
18
Frequently, lawsuits go unanswered by consumers. In some cases,
19
consumers do not receive adequate notice of the lawsuit. In others,
consumers either feel that disputing a debt that they acknowledge
they owe would be futile, or that defending a suit would be too
20
expensive and difficult.
In any case, where a consumer fails to
respond to or defend a suit, a default judgment is usually entered in
21
favor of the consumer credit plaintiff.
The collectors can then
begin garnishing wages or property of the consumer to collect on the
22
23
judgment, or sometimes have the consumer placed in jail.
Importantly, many consumer advocates believe that if the suits were

programs are usually set up by credit card companies with their interest in mind, not
the individual’s. Id. at 284. Debt settlement is somewhat in between bankruptcy and
debt management, where a company agrees to reduce the principal amount in
return for regular payments. Id. at 287.
13. BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 5; see Segal, supra note 1 (noting consumer
credit obligations typically in the form of credit card debt, auto loans, and utility
bills).
14. This Note will refer to the plaintiff in these suits—original creditors, debt
collectors, debt buyers, or other third-parties—as consumer credit plaintiffs.
15. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom In Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom—In Lawsuits,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2010, at A1.
16. Segal, supra note 1.
17. Id.
18. See BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 7 (reporting that panelists estimated that
sixty to ninety-five percent of lawsuits end in default).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6.
23. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 17, 2011, at C1.

WU.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

5/24/2011 3:26 PM

VIGILANTE JUSTICE

1565

defended rather than ignored, more often than not, the consumers
24
would prevail.
Compounding the problem for consumers on the whole is the rate
25
at which lawsuits are filed. In many of the lawsuits, consumer credit
plaintiffs are aided by the use of automated software to churn out
26
complaints. With some software programs, once minimal data on
the consumer is collected, including the “name, home address, the
outstanding balance, the date of default and whether interest is still
accruing on the account,” the software begins processing collection
27
letters, summonses and lawsuits. Because acquiring more data on a
consumer increases the price of the account purchased by the debt
buyer, essential information is often missing from the affidavit to a
28
court.
This missing information consists of the proper
documentation of a debt’s origins (including history and amount)
and usually shows proof of the claim, which is what the court requires
29
of an affidavit.
Another issue is that lawsuits to collect on consumer credit
obligations are typically filed in state courts, where each state’s
30
substantive and procedural standards are applied. These standards,
however, “vary considerably by state and, in some instances, within a
state depending on the local jurisdiction or whether they are used in
31
small claims court or civil court.”

24. See Segal, supra note 1 (reporting one lawyer who estimated he only lost four
out of 5,000 consumer credit cases).
25. See Martin, supra note 5 (describing how one prolific law firm has been
“clogging courtrooms” with loan repayment lawsuits).
26. See id. (reporting that the automated software has the ability to “take a file
and run it through the entire legal system automatically” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
27. Id.
28. Segal, supra note 1.
29. Id.; see, e.g., MD. RULES 3-306(a) (“The affidavit shall be accompanied (1) by
supporting documents or statements containing sufficient detail as to liability and
damages, including the precise amount of the claim and any interest claimed; and
(2) if the claim is founded upon a note, security agreement, or other instrument, by
the original or a photocopy of the executed instrument . . . .”); PA. R. CIV. P. 1019(a),
(i) (requiring the contents of pleadings to contain “[t]he material facts on which a
cause of action or defense is based,” and that “[w]hen any claim or defense is based
upon a writing, the pleader shall attach a copy of the writing, or the material part
thereof”).
30. See BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that the conduct of debt
collectors is also subject to federal law, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act).
31. Id.; see, e.g., Sam Glover, Has the Flood of Debt Collection Lawsuits Swept Away
Minnesotans’ Due Process Rights?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2009) (noting
that Minnesota is a creditor-friendly jurisdiction where creditors can “commence
lawsuits without filing them, garnish bank accounts and wages without paying a filing
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B. Facts and Procedural History
In Collins Financial Services v. Vigilante, Collins Financial Services
(“CFS”) commenced a suit against the debtor, Helen Vigilante, on
February 14, 2008 in New York Civil Court, alleging a failure to pay
32
charges stemming from a consumer credit agreement. CFS was the
assignee of the debt from the initial creditor, American Investment
33
Bank, N.A. (“AIB”). After receiving an answer from the defendant,
the matter appeared on the court’s calendar on June 10, 2008, at
34
which time the defendant did not appear.
On October 14, 2008, CFS prepared a judgment form and
provided an “affidavit of facts” from its “Custodian of Records,” which
35
the court received on October 24, 2008. On October 30, 2008, the
court clerk rejected the judgment, noting that the plaintiff’s name
from the initial summons did not match that on the judgment form,
but on November 26, 2008, the court corrected the erroneous
36
rejection and entered judgment for the plaintiff. Pursuant to New
37
York Civil Practice Law and Rules, the plaintiff then applied to
assign the judgment to a third party, Precision Recovery Analytics,
Inc. (“PRA”), which ultimately brought the matter to the court’s
38
attention.
In the opinion, the court addressed two issues: (1) whether the
affidavit was sufficient to permit the assignment of the initial
judgment, and (2) whether the original claim was for a “sum
39
certain.” Regarding assignability, Judge Straniere noted the court’s
requirement that for default judgments, an affidavit of facts from a

fee, and obtain default judgments without producing evidence to substantiate their
claims” (citing MINN. STAT. § 571.71 (2008))).
32. 915 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (Civ. Ct. 2011).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 915–16.
36. See id. at 916 (noting that the name of the plaintiff “Collins Financial Services,
Inc., assignee in interest to American Investment Bank, N.A.,” is properly on both
the complaint and the summons).
37. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3215(a) (McKinney 2007) (“When a defendant has failed
to appear, plead or proceed to trial of an action reached and called for trial . . . the
plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him. If the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, application may be
made to the clerk within one year after the default. The clerk, upon submission of
the requisite proof, shall enter judgment for the amount demanded in the complaint
or stated in the notice served . . . . Where the case is not one in which the clerk can
enter judgment, the plaintiff shall apply to the court for judgment.”).
38. Vigilante, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
39. Id. at 916–17.
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party to the action must be provided, upon which the court clerk
40
examining the file could calculate the amount due. Additionally,
where the debt is sold to a third party, affidavits are required by both
41
the debt seller and the debt buyer to establish title. In the instant
case, the court determined that the affidavit of facts was not made
42
from someone with personal knowledge. Instead, the affiant was a
“Custodian of Records” for CFS who made the affidavit based only
43
Further, under additional assignment
upon “information.”
guidelines, the court found that there was insufficient documentation
of the chain of assignments from AIB to CFS and then CFS to PRA to
44
allow the default judgment.
Having rejected the assignment and vacated the underlying
judgment, the court could have ended the discussion of the specific
case. Instead, it went on to address the predominant “issue that
permeates the entire practice of entering a default judgment against
a non-answering defendant”—whether the amount claimed due is a
45
“sum certain.”
The court noted that when a defendant fails to
appear or answer a complaint, it is only a default to liability; it is not a
46
default toward the amount claimed due.

40. Id. at 916. A complaint merely verified by the attorney for the plaintiff is not
sufficient for a default judgment unless the attorney provides an additional
affirmation that he or she has personal knowledge to the facts at issue. Id.
Additionally, the court noted that under new directives installed by the Chief
Administrative Judge in May 2009:
when a third-party other than the original lender is seeking to enter a default
judgment, an affidavit of sale of the account by the original creditor is
needed. If the debt is sold to another third-party debt collector, an
additional affidavit by that debt seller is required . . . . [N]o default
judgment may be entered unless accompanied by an affidavit from the debt
collector or the attorney stating that after reasonable inquiry, he or she has
reason to believe that the statute of limitations has not expired.
Id. (noting that the affidavit requirement is for compliance with the Federal Debt
Collection Practices Act).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 917.
43. See id. (commenting that the affidavit lacked any information regarding when
the original contract between AIB and the defendant was made or when the last
payment was made). The court also noted that the affidavit was notarized, but not
acknowledged. Id. Further, the notarization was from Texas, which requires a
certificate of conformity, but such certificate was also lacking in the submission. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 917–18 (“[W]here application is made to the clerk, i.e., in cases where
the claim is ‘for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made
certain,’ entry of a judgment by the clerk is authorized only where there can be no
reasonable question about the amount of the judgment . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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To this end, the court explained that the damages amount must be
47
Referring to section
readily ascertained without extrinsic proof.
3215 of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules on default judgments,
the court found that a clerk may only enter a default judgment where
there is a “sum certain” and “upon submission of the requisite
48
proof.” Up until this point, requisite proof in New York had been
based merely on an “affidavit of facts” from a person with “personal
knowledge” of the facts, without any requirement of what
49
documentation would verify the underlying facts. The court was
dissatisfied with this minimal requirement, holding that “[s]uch a
system is not tolerable in regard to credit card and other consumer
credit debt cases where items such as the interest rate, late payment
charge, and over-the-limit fees may change several times over the
50
course of the consumer credit agreement.”
The court explained that a typical plaintiff’s complaint merely
“pleads an amount due and owing which[,] upon the default of the
51
defendant[,] the plaintiff is asserting is a ‘sum certain.’”
This
amount due typically does not describe in detail how that sum was
calculated, when in reality it involves calculations of items purchased,
52
cash advances, and fluctuating interest rates.
The court
acknowledged that such terms were “presumably set forth in the
agreement with the debtor but never specified or disclosed in the
pleading or subsequent documents submitted to the court in an
53
attempt to obtain a default judgment.”

47. Id. at 918.
48. See id. (noting that “requisite proof” left room for a lot of interpretation).
49. Id.
50. See id. (explaining that this practice was useful in other contexts such as
promissory notes or breach of contract, “where the pleadings and the affidavit of
facts would permit the defendant or the clerk examining the file to calculate the
amount due”).
51. Id. at 919. Attempting to clarify the definition of “sum certain,” the court
referred to Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the New York
legislature and found that at a minimum, due process required that the affidavit of
facts include the original agreement between the cardholder and card issuer with the
corresponding interest rates. Id. at 918–19 (emphasizing that this particular section
of the UCC is relied on to determine if an instrument is a “negotiable instrument”
and is not a rule of evidence); see N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-106(1) (McKinney 2001) (defining
a sum certain with stated rates of interests, stated discounts, with exchange, or with
costs of collection).
52. See Vigilante, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (explaining that the calculation of the
amount due is difficult given that the consumer credit industry routinely uses
variable interest rates based on different factors, as well as various fees tacked on to
accounts).
53. Id.
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Recounting its experience with creditors and insufficient summary
judgment motions, the court announced that it could “no longer
tolerate a system of entering default and ‘inquest clerk’ judgments
without requiring substantially greater documentation from plaintiffs
54
claiming the amount due and owing is a ‘sum certain.’” Due to the
nature of consumer credit transactions, it would be difficult to
ascertain the proper amounts due from the “four corners of the
55
instrument.”
The court then set out a twelve-item list of documented
information that a plaintiff’s affidavit of facts must have in order to
provide requisite proof for an entry of default judgment:
1. Date the consumer credit agreement was entered into by the
defendant.
2. Name of the original creditor.
3. A complete history of the assignment of the account.
4. The date of the last payment by the defendant.
5. The amount of the last payment by the defendant.
6. The last date a purchase or a cash advance was made by the
defendant.
7. The original credit card number and if the account number was
changed during the period the card was in use, a history of the
account numbers.
8. The outstanding balance on the date of the last payment.
9. A calculation of the outstanding balance on the date of the last
payment setting forth the amount of purchases, the interest
charged, late, over-the-limit and other fees assessed.
10. A statement of how the interest rate was calculated along with
copies of all documents which made changes to the consumer
credit agreement. If there were changes in the interest rate and
fees charged copies of the documentation to support such changes.
11. A statement that the address for the defendant set forth in the
summons and complaint is the current address of the defendant
and that a good faith effort was made to determine a current
address for the defendant.
12. Copies of all extrinsic documents referred to in the consumer
credit agreement and if an extrinsic index was used to calculate the

54. Id. at 920 (emphasis added).
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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interest rate, proof of the rate in that index on the date calculation
56
was made.

Applying these standards to the plaintiff, the court vacated the
default judgment because the plaintiff failed to prove the amount
57
due and how the amount was calculated.
II. ANALYSIS
The court in Vigilante stressed the importance that affiants in a
default judgment case have personal knowledge of the debt to
58
establish title. Going forward, courts should place more emphasis
on the personal knowledge requirement to ensure that plaintiffs have
59
proper standing to bring a claim. The problem of signing affidavits
without the requisite personal knowledge is well reported; with one
article stating that “affidavit–signers at debt–buying companies
appear to have little choice but to take at face value the few facts
typically provided to them—often little more than basic account
60
information on a computer screen.”
Despite this, courts across
jurisdictions are still split on whether affidavits from custodians of
61
records satisfy the personal knowledge requirement.
The personal knowledge requirement should not be satisfied
where an affidavit is merely based on facts provided to the affiant
about a debt; rather, the affiant should have personal knowledge of

56. Id. These requirements heavily mirror the proposed changes in the New
York’s currently and previously proposed Consumer Credit Fairness Act. See
Consumer Credit Fairness Act, Assemb. 633, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 6 (N.Y. 2011)
(outlining potential changes to Rule 3016 of New York’s civil practice law and rules,
including itemization of the amount sought using similar factors as the Vigilante
court); Consumer Credit Fairness Act, S. 4398, 232d Legis., Reg. Sess., § 6 (N.Y.
2009) (same).
57. The court did, however, allow the plaintiff to reinstate the judgment by
seeking an “inquest on papers” and submitting the documentation as requested, or
by seeking an “inquest before the court” and bringing a witness who could explain
the calculations of the amount due and owing. Vigilante, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
58. Vigilante, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 916; see supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
59. See Clinton Rooney, Defense of Assigned Consumer Debts, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
542, 543 (2010) (arguing that without establishing title to a debt, a party should not
have standing to sue).
60. Segal, supra note 1.
61. Compare HSBC Bank Nevada NA v. Griswold, Nos. 2010AP759, 2010AP1826,
2010 WL 5393263 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2010) (finding that a debt collector’s
affidavit did not show the proper foundation of personal knowledge to introduce the
bank statements under the business records exception), with Wood v. Pharia LLC,
No. 01-10-00579-CV, 2010 WL 5060621, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2010) (holding
that the plaintiff’s affiant had personal knowledge of third-party bank statements
held by the plaintiff in its regular course of business and ruling that the statements
satisfied the hearsay exception for business records).
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62

the facts underlying the debt. Without this requirement, the default
judgment is based solely on evidence that would otherwise likely be
63
inadmissible as hearsay. Accordingly, since the Vigilante decision,
one New York court has vacated a default judgment due to a failure
by the plaintiff “to offer any non-hearsay proof establishing either a
64
cause of action for breach of contract or account stated.”
Particularly where the debt is assigned, a chain must be established
to show how each party has personal knowledge of the debt. Without
personal knowledge of the debt, a consumer credit plaintiff cannot
be sure of the origin and nature of the debt or the proper calculation
of the debt. Absent an affidavit based on personal knowledge, a
consumer credit plaintiff should not be awarded a default judgment.
Perhaps even more important than its emphasis on the importance
of satisfying the personal knowledge requirement, the Vigilante court
laid a foundation for what is required to determine a sum certain in
consumer credit cases. Other courts should follow the lead of the
New York court by proactively requiring greater detail about the debt
and the underlying documentation, even if a complaint goes
65
unanswered or undefended. As the court noted, a mere affidavit of
facts provided by the plaintiff does not properly document the nature
and amount of the debt due to a number of calculations that typically
66
go into consumer credit obligations. The lengthy twelve-item list of
requisite proof for a sum certain indicates that the court was not
satisfied with a consumer credit plaintiff’s cursory efforts in collecting
67
information. Similarly, Judge Straniere recently noted in a different
decision that when looking at the submissions of consumer credit
plaintiffs, the submissions for the most part “lack a ‘nano’ of a

62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted”); People v. Slaughter, 596 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24
(App. Div. 1993) (“Out of court statements which are offered for the truth of their
content constitute hearsay, and may not be admitted unless they come within an
exception to the hearsay rule.”).
64. See Velocity Invs., LLC v. McCaffrey, 31 Misc. 3d 308, 317 (N.Y. D. Ct. 2011)
(explaining that the proof offered by the plaintiff was “clearly and unquestionably
inadequate to obtain the judgment”).
65. See, e.g., Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Dalbis, No. 300082/10, 2011 WL 873512, at
*1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Mar. 14, 2011) (requiring proof of the claim even though the
motion for a default judgment came unopposed).
66. Collins Fin. Servs. v. Vigilante, 915 N.Y.S.2d 912, 919 (Civ. Ct. 2011).
67. See id. at 914, 918 (describing how an amount due cannot be simply stated
because it is based on a “compilation of many things,” which then served as the basis
for the court’s list for requisite proof).
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‘modicum’ of a ‘scintilla’ of a prima facie case so as to be entitled to a
68
judgment whether it be by default or otherwise.” Without sufficient
documentation, default defendants could be subject to gross
miscalculations.
In the short term, Vigilante provides a road map for consumers and
69
consumer credit plaintiffs when initiating or defending a lawsuit;
even if the requirements have not been adopted in other
jurisdictions, parties can anticipate objections or defenses and plan
accordingly. Moving forward, consumer credit plaintiffs should make
diligent efforts to present the documentation listed by the court or
offer explanations for their absence. Conversely, consumers should
object to the absence of any information or documentation included
in the list. Even if a state’s laws for a sum certain or its equivalent are
not specifically defined, the standards that the New York court
established by which a sum certain is proved should translate to
70
different states.
Whereas in the past, the default judgment rule
seemed to place the burden on the defendant to show that the
amount stated was not the amount detailed in the complaint or
affidavit of facts, under the new requirements the burden more
appropriately falls on the plaintiff to show precisely how the amount
due is calculated.
In the long term, Vigilante sends a strong signal to the New York
legislature that courts support the proposed changes to the pleading
71
rules, as well as increased consumer protections.
While the
legislature grapples with its decision, the judicial measures will not
only prevent plaintiffs from improperly collecting on default
judgments without adequate proof, but may also have a profound
effect on the internal processes of consumer credit plaintiffs. As
noted above, due to either cost or laziness, many consumer credit
72
plaintiffs collect only a minimal amount of consumer information.
Forcing consumer credit plaintiffs to acquire more information and

68. Dalbis, 2011 WL 873512, at *13.
69. See Vigilante, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (listing twelve items necessary to provide
requisite proof for entry of a default judgment); supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
70. Cf. BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that procedural and substantive
laws already differ among states and jurisdictions).
71. Supra note 65 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text; see also Dalbis, 2011 WL 873512,
at *12 (questioning the inability of consumer credit plaintiffs to provide information,
and wondering whether “this seemingly industry-wide problem exists because there is
either an inability to provide the necessary documentation or just an unwillingness”).
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attach the underlying documents might change the cost models and
the processes by which consumer credit plaintiffs operate. In turn,
the longer or costlier process of collecting information might slow
73
Although the
the tide of complaints filed before the court.
requirements impose greater burdens on consumer credit plaintiffs
in the debt collection process, compliance with the newly delineated
requirements should ensure that consumers repay the debts they
rightfully owe.
CONCLUSION
Vigilante addressed two glaring issues particular to default
judgments, both of which previously allowed an active debt collection
industry to collect from consumers without facing many obstacles.
While the decision to require more documentation creates a greater
burden and cost on consumer credit plaintiffs, it does not create a
74
loophole for consumers who have genuinely incurred a debt.
Vigilante is one of the first instances where a court expressly
delineated the standard of proof required for creditors in default
judgment cases. Given the increases in debt collection litigation, it is
important that some barriers exist to slow down the process and
ensure that consumer credit plaintiffs provide the necessary
documentation to show title to a debt and that the amount claimed is
correctly calculated.
These barriers protect consumer interests by ensuring that all
requisite proof for a consumer credit obligation is attached to the
complaint. Without the added requirements, consumer credit
plaintiffs will be free to continue churning out complaints against
consumers and reaping the benefits of antiquated default judgment
laws.

73. Consumer aspects aside, the potential for decreased case loads will perhaps
lessen the strain on all court levels, ensuring that courtroom clerks and judges
address cases efficiently and fairly.
74. See Dalbis, 2011 WL 873512, at *13 (“This court believes that people who
make purchases using their credit cards should pay for them. However, when they
do not pay the debt, and plaintiff’s [sic] use the court system to enforce the
obligation, the rules of evidence and legal precedents existing will then govern the
transaction. If this is creating the impression that the courts are ‘pro-consumer’ the
credit card industry need only to look in the mirror to see the real reason for this
seeming intense judicial scrutiny.”).

